Half A Case Against Vivisection

We may elaborate as much as we like, but all that needs to be said about vivisection is that it is unethical to deliberately inflict suffering on any unconsenting sentient creature human or other except when it is manifestly in the interests of that individual creature. (One might also except, perhaps cases where the survival of another individual is at stake).

However, let us elaborate a little. Firstly, which are the sentient creatures? The answer must be that, somewhere along the scale from humans to bacteria, sentiency, as we understand it, must have diminished to a point of insignificance. Where the line should be drawn is probably not determinable, but it would certainly be a long way below rats and mice, by far the most commonly used laboratory animals, (they breed the fastest and are the least expensive).

Laboratory animals provide rather unreliable models of human illnesses and human reactions to various stimuli. Scientifically, it would obviously be far better to use humans for research, toxicity testing and so forth. But the use of unconsenting humans in procedures possibly inimical to their own interests (although it has been done, and not only in Nazi Germany) is not generally acceptable.

Who matters most?
Practitioners and defenders of vivisection must, then rely wholly on the proposition that animals matter less than humans. The 'reasons' why they are supposed to matter less vary, such as: "they don't have souls"; "they're less intelligent"; "they're not self-aware and so don't know they're suffering"; "they don't feel pain so much as we do". None of these 'reasons' stand up: we don't know that animals have no souls (or even that humans do have them); if intelligence matters, then it must be worse to inflict pain on a clever human than on a stupid one, and it should be all right to use human morons for experiments; we can't know a creature's level of self-awareness, and anyway humans with certain mental handicaps don't seem to have much self-awareness, if any, so why not use them instead? It's impossible to tell how much pain an animal is feeling, but they seem to feel pain all right, and if there's any doubt we must give them the benefit of it.

To whom do they matter?

But we must ask, matter to whom? If mice , as individuals, don't matter much to scientists, we may be sure that scientists don't matter at all to mice. Humans will of course say that their own species matters most; rats, if they could have and express an opinion, would probably place human life and welfare fairly low on their list of priorities, not worth the death of even one rat.

We humans just happen to be in a position of power over all the other animals; exploiting them for our own advantage, against their own interests, is just abuse of the weak by the strong, the powerless by the powerful. Such abuse is thought unacceptable in human affairs; there is no reason not to hold it equally objectionable in the wider context of all animal life.

The second half of a case against vivisection I leave to others; it is that vivisection may not really be very good science. Have the benefits to humanity outweighed the many adverse effects from drugs developed and tested using laboratory animals? I don't know the answer, but more importantly, whatever the answer, it doesn't affect the ethical case against, vivisection which I think is unassailable.

Trick questions confronted

Supporters of vivisection sometimes seek to win sympathy by asking simplistic 'trick' questions. What if your own child was struck by a mortal illness to which a cure might be found by experimenting on laboratory animals? In this hypothetical situation I'd have to choose between the life and welfare of my child and those of a number of laboratory animals. I would choose my child, because for me, the suffering and death of my child would be worse than the suffering and death of some laboratory animals that are not my particular friends. Which would actually suffer more, my friend or the animals, I don't know. Possibly the animals, because less care would be taken to minimise their suffering. My choice would be the selfish one; I don't know that it would be the right one.

What would I do if I myself was mortally ill and animal experimentation might lead to a cure? I don't know, but I think I know what I should do; refuse to condone the infliction of suffering and death just because it might save my life. But few of us are that heroic; in extremis I might be unable to die up to my principles.

These hypothetical scenarios are usually unrealistic; it takes years to develop drugs and therapies, more years to test them, and more years to manufacture and market them, by which time the people in the 'what would you do if...' questions would all be dead. And of course in real life the decision that animal experiments should be initiated or continued wouldn't be made by an ill person or it's parent, but by people directing work in research laboratories. Frankly I've little time for these 'trick' questions. Such diversionary tactics are typically resorted to when a case is unsustainable.

However, I'm not in any of these situations, so don't have to make such decisions. I'm in the situation that I'm going to die of something, and according to conventional medical wisdom animal experiments might find a cure or a palliative for whatever it's going to be, and so eventually postpone my death or alleviate my suffering. Yet I oppose all animal experiments because I don't give myself the right to torture and kill other animals (that can't give their consent and aren't going to benefit), which I believe should have the right to live out their own lives in appropriate and congenial environments - the same right I want for myself and everyone else.

Well then, what about ill and suffering people in general? Some amount of suffering is endemic to the human situation; to abolish suffering we must abolish life. But we choose to procreate, knowing our children will suffer and die. By choosing life we accept suffering. Of course we may try to reduce and alleviate suffering. But we should not (by virtue of our power over them) arrogate to ourselves a right to condemn other animals to unnecessary suffering and premature death in laboratories because we make this choice.

Ruarc Gahan
Irish Anti-Vivisection Society
Letter to The Irish Times, March 2000

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